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Les modèles de développement financier : une analyse en termes de Clusters 
 
Résumé 
Cet article est une contribution à l'analyse de la diversité des modèles de développement 
financière dans des pays en voie de développement. Partant de variables clés comme le 
degré de contrôle de système bancaire et des marches financiers, la capitalisation boursière 
des  pays,  notre  analyse  empirique    nous  conduit  à  proposer  une  typologie  de  systèmes 
financiers : un système embryonnaire et répressif, un système de finance intermédié et un 
système financier à la maturité. Cette typologie ne peut valider l'hypothèse d'un modèle 
financier spécifique aux pays émergents, mais plutôt celle d’un modèle spécifique aux PED 
dans leur globalité et un modèle pour les pays développés. 
Mots-clés : Développement financier, croissance, modèle de capitalisme, analyse factorielle 
et cluster. 
 
Model of Financial Development: A cluster analysis 
Abstract 
This article is a contribution to the analysis of financial development diversity in developing 
countries and lies within model of capitalism’s framework. By taking into account the degree 
of control of banking system and securities markets, our empirical analysis produces a three-
group typology identifying an embryonic financial system, an intermediate financial system 
bank oriented and a financial system in maturity. Moreover, this typology cannot support 
the hypothesis of a model specific to emerging countries but a model for LDC countries and a 
model for developed countries. 
Keywords:  Financial  development,  growth,  models  of  capitalism,  factorial  analysis,  and 
cluster analysis. 





Reference to this paper: NICET-CHENAF Dalila (2012) Model of Financial Development: A cluster 
analysis, Cahiers du GREThA, n°2012-01. 
 http://ideas.repec.org/p/grt/wpegrt/2012-01.html. 
 Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
3 
1. Introduction 
The financial system consists of the banking sector (including supervisory institutions such as 
central  banks  and  governments),  stock  markets,  and  the  money  supply.  As  regards  financial 
development’s role in economic development, there are two main schools of thought. The first one 
asserts that financial development plays a limited role in accompanying the development of real 
activity (Robinson, 1952; Lucas, 1998). This school considers that when the economy develops, the 
financial  system  develops.  For  example,  Robinson  (1952),  asserts  that  “where  enterprises  lead, 
finance follows” and, for Lucas (1998), economists “badly over-stress” the role of financial factors in 
economic growth. As for development economists, they frequently ignore this role in their studies. 
For Rajan and Zingales (1998) or Cameron (1967), although financial development is essential for 
growth, it is only “a lubricant but not a substitute for the machine”. For Rajan and Zingales (1998), it 
is the availability of profitable investment opportunities which is essential.  The second school of 
thought  accords  a  crucial  role  to  financial  development  in  boosting  the  processes  of  growth, 
innovation and economic development (Bagehot, 1873, Schumpeter, 1911, Mac Kinnon 1973, Levine 
1997). For these authors, causality proceeds from financial to economic development; it is only at a 
later stage that financial development leads on to growth. Haber, North and Weingast, (2008) assert 
that « countries do not have large banking systems and securities markets because they are wealthy; 
they are wealthy because they have large banking systems and securities markets ». Similarly, for 
King and Levine (1993), finance does not merely follow in the wake of economic activity. They affirm 
that the significant robust relationship between the degree of financial development and the rate of 
economic  growth  indicates  much  more  than  a  positive  association  between  contemporaneous 
shocks and financial/economic development.  For Levine (1997), there is even evidence according to 
which the level of financial development is a good predictor of future rates of growth, of capital 
accumulation and of technological change
1.  
Between these two polar positions (financial development merely accompanying economic 
development vs. financial development as a growth factor), we can find another group of scholars for 
whom  the  market  promotes  growth,  with  growth,  in  turn,  encouraging  market  formation 
(Greenwood and Smith, 1997, Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990): market structures would, in this 
case, be endogenous. However, in Greenwood and Jovanovic’s model (1990), financial intermediaries 
invest more productively than individuals, because they can identify investment opportunities more 
easily.  This means  that  financial  intermediaries  promote  growth  by ensuring  higher  earnings  on 
capital,  and  growth,  in  turn,  allows  costly  investments  to  be  implemented.  However,  a  “good” 
financial  system  must  always  enable  a  country  to  mobilize  its  savings  for  investment  inside  its 
frontiers by first allowing the most profitable projects to be identified, and then assigning resources 
for those projects, thanks to reduced transaction costs. Financial development also has to facilitate 
risk management and corporate control. Consequently, financial markets must provide for a whole 
range of services by: helping to mobilize and pool savings; providing payment services to facilitate 
the  exchange  of  goods  and  services;  producing  and  processing  information  about  investors; 
monitoring investments and exercising corporate governance; helping to diversify, transform and 
manage risk (Levine, 1997; Demirgüc-Kunt, 2007). 
In this paper we want to understand if the shape of the financial system (whether market-
based or bank-based) or the financing modalities of economy (credits or securities, informal) – in 
other sense- if model of financial system are in relationship with model of development. And finally if 
exits a specific system for emerging countries this in relationship with the theses according to which 
                                                      
1 However, for Rajan and Zingales (1998), financial development may predict economic growth simply because financial markets anticipate 
future growth. Equally, they consider that the stock market capitalizes the present value of growth opportunity, while financial institutions 
lend more if economic sectors grow. Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
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emerging market are emerging financial market. To answer this question we proceed in three steps. 
We  justify  the  choice  of  the  variables  which  allow  us  to  measure  the  size,  the  depth  and  the 
accessibility of financial markets. We propose then a typology of financial models. To finish classify 
countries, in particular emerging countries according to this typology. This allow us to answer the 
question; Is there a specific model of financial system for emerging  economies? 
2. How can financial development or efficiency be measured?  
In the literature on subject, financial development can be measured in terms of: i) size, ii) 
accessibility and iii) performance. But, we can also consider iv) institutional indicators to categorize 
financial system. 
i) Goldsmith’s pioneering study (1969) of 35 countries over the period 1860-1963, uses the 
value of intermediary assets divided by GNP to gauge financial development and thereby measure 
the size of financial systems.  King and Levine (1993), using a sample of 80 countries over the period 
1960-1989,  proposed four indicators of the level of financial development: 
· “Depth”, to measure the size of financial intermediaries. This variable is equal to the liquid 
liabilities of the financial system (M2) plus demand and the interest-bearing liabilities of bank 
and non-bank financial intermediaries, all subsequently divided by GDP. 
· “Bank”, to compare the different roles played by central or commercial banks in allocating 
credit. This variable is equal to the ratio of bank credit divided by bank credit plus central bank 
domestic assets. Commercial banks are likely to offer better risk management and investment 
information  services  than  central  banks.  Financial  systems  that  primarily  fund  the  private 
sector probably provide more services than those that simply funnel credit to the government 
or to state enterprises.  
· “Private”, to measure the place occupied by banks and markets in the financing of the private 
sector. This variable is equal to the ratio of credit allocated to private enterprises divided by 
total domestic credit (excluding credit to banks).  
· “Privy”, to measure the place occupied by banks and markets in the financing of firms. This 
variable is equal to credit to private enterprises divided by GDP. 
In Demerguc-Kunt’s study (2007), private credit (value of credit by financial intermediaries to 
private sector divided by GDP) and stock markets capitalization (value of listed shares divided by 
GDP) are used to measure financial depth.  
Levine and Zervos (1996) also use “stock market capitalization” to measure the size of stock 
markets. To measure stock market liquidity, they use two measurements. First, they compute the 
ratio of total value of trades on the major stock exchanges divided by GDP. This measures the value 
of equity transactions in relation to the size of the economy. The second liquidity measurement is 
equal to the ratio of the total values of trades on the major stock exchanges divided by market 
capitalization (turnover ratio). 
Rajan and Zingales (1988) also uses two measurement of financial development: the first one 
is the ratio of domestic credit plus stock market capitalization to GDP. The second, “accounting 
standards”, a proxy for financial development, is an index developed by the CIFA and research which 
ranks the amount of disclosure required in each country’s annual company reports.  
 Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
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ii) In some studies, liquidity is measured by secondary market trading costs - but merely to 
evaluate  the  relationship  between  stock  market  liquidity  and  national  growth  rates,  capital 
accumulation rate and rates of technological change. As for Demerguc-Kunt (2007), they generally 
use “M2” as a proxy of financial system size. They also use an index of freedom in the banking and 
the financial sector to measure banking industry openness. This index includes several dimensions: 
the extent of government involvement in the financial sector through ownership and control of 
financial institutions, the quality of regulation and supervision, the existence of interest control, 
activity restriction and the ability of foreign institutions to operate freely.  
To measure stock market liquidity, Levine and Zervos (1996) use two indicators: the first, 
“LLY1”, is the ratio of total value of trades on the major stock exchanges divided by GDP; the second, 
“LLY2”, is  equal to the ratio of the total value of trades on the major stock exchanges divided by 
market capitalization ( turnover ratio). 
iii) The net interest margin (the gap between what banks pay the providers of funds and what 
they obtain from bank credit users)
2 is generally employed in studies to measure market efficiency, 
and this is particularly the case for Demerguc-Kunt (2007).  
To measure risk diversification and international integration, Levine and Zervos (1996) use 
Korajczyk’s (1996) estimate of the degree of international integration of national stock markets, as 
well as the IAPM (International Arbitrage Pricing Model). 
We  should  note  that,  in  order  to  measure  market  accessibility  (Table  1),  we  have  added 
“informal sector”, to take into account the specificity of LDCs in which personal wealth remains the 
primary source of business start-up capital, since small firms have only limited access to banks. In 
fact, the use of bank loans is correlated with company size, and only the biggest firms have most of 
their start-up capital financed by bank debt. For example, Fafchamps (2004) shows in his study on 
Zimbabwe that bank business start-up loans were used by only 10% of firms. Loans from friends or 
family are significant sources of start-up capital for microenterprises and, to a lesser extent, for small 
firms whose contact with banks is negligible. Consequently, the existence of a large “informal sector” 
signifies that access to bank financing is really limited. 
iv) Institutional indicators. 
The earliest attempts to explain financial system differences between countries focused on the 
history of the country and, in particular, on the origins of that country’s legal system. For legal origins 
theory, a country’s financial development level is determined by its colonial history.  British colonies, 
since  they  had  adopted  the  legal  institutions  of  British  common  law,  benefited  from  better 
protection for minority shareholders and enjoyed a more developed financial system than the French 
colonies, which had adopted the French Civil Code (Haber, North et Weingast, 2008, La Porta, 1998)
3.  
According to Modigliani and Miller’s model (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), the size of capital 
markets should be proportional to GNP, because their size is determined by the cash flow coming 
from investors. But differences in the size of financial markets in countries with similar GNP cannot 
be explained by this model. The agency model could, however, explain why some countries have 
much bigger capital markets than others, since it is clear that countries differ in the extent to which 
they offer legal protection to investors (La Porta and Lopez de Silanes (1998)).  
                                                      
2 NIM equals interest income minus interest expense divided by interest-bearing assets, averaged for each country’s bank(s). 
3 We can use dummies (English or French colonies) to measure this.  Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
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La Porta and Lopez de Silanes (1998), considered two legal traditions: common law and civil 
law. Most English-speaking countries have inherited the common law tradition, with its commercial 
law being based on the British Companies Act. Other countries respect the civil law tradition, derived 
from Roman law. There are three main families: the French one, based on the Napoleonic code of 
1804; the German one, based on Bismarck’s code of 1911
4; and the Scandinavian family, described by 
La  Porta  as  being  less  derived  from  Roman  law.  In  general,  it  is  considered  that  common  law 
countries give shareholders and creditors strong legal rights, and that French civil law countries offer 
only weak protection.  
For La Porta and Lopez de Silanes (1998), the legal origins of law matter, and good protection 
and financial development are determined by different factors which concern the legal rules applying  
to shareholders, creditors and to contract enforcement
5. 
Shareholders’ rights: these concern, in particular, the right to vote, which is shareholders’ main 
source  of  power.  Other  rights  include  anti-director  rights;  voting  powers
6;  corporate  voting 
participation  rights
7;  cumulative  voting  for  directors;  proportional  board  representation 
mechanisms
8; legal protection against directors’ oppression
9; a pre-emptive right
10; the capacity to 
call  an  extraordinary  shareholders’  meeting
11,  the  right  to  a  mandatory  dividend
12;  and,  finally, 
protection from expropriation by management.  
Creditors’ rights: in La Porta and Lopez de Silvanes (1998), the rules concerning creditors’ rights 
cover loan security, asset seizure in case of loan default, and the impossibility for management to 
seek unilateral protection from creditors.  Accordingly, La Porta and Lopez de Silvanes’ study consider 
five  dummies  and  an  index:  “No  automatic  stays  on  assets”
13;  “secured  creditors  paid  first”
14; 
“restrictions  on  going  into  reorganization”
15;  “Management  cannot  stay  in  reorganization”
16; 
“creditors’ rights”
17 and “Minimum mandatory legal reserve
18”.  It is considered that these indicators 
measure the ease with which investors can exercise their powers against management.  
Other authors stress the role of geographic endowments. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) show 
that  if  geographic  endowments  and  agricultural  production  fostered  a  large  middle  class,  the 
institutions were more egalitarian but more closed if they fostered the rise of powerful elites.   
                                                      
4 The first law was voted in 1883. 
5 This point is developed in part 4.3. 
6 Investors may be better protected when dividend rights are closely bound up with voting rights (i.e when companies in a country are subject 
to the one share/one vote rule). In the La Porta and Lopez de Silvanes study, the dummy “one share/one vote rule” is used to identify this 
shareholder right.  
7 Anti-director rights measure how strongly the legal system favours minority shareholders versus management or dominant shareholders in 
the corporate decision-making process, including the voting process. For these anti-director rights, the authors use a proxy: “voting by mail”. 
8 The effect of either rule is to give minority shareholders more power to put their representatives on the boards of directors. 
9 These mechanisms may include, for example, the right to challenge the directors’ decisions in court, or the right to force the company to 
repurchase the shares of those minority shareholders who object to certain fundamental management decisions. 
10 This right is intended to protect shareholders from dilution. 
11 It is assumed that the higher this percentage is, the harder it is for minority shareholders to organize a meeting to challenge or oust 
management. This percentage varies from 3 percent to 33 percent. 
12 The mandatory dividend right is a legal substitute for the weakness of other forms of minority shareholder protection. 
13 When a firm risks bankruptcy, two creditor strategies are possible: liquidation or reorganization. In   some countries, in the case of re-
organization, the procedures impose an automatic stay on assets.  This rule protects managers and unsecured creditors against secured 
creditors, and prevents automatic liquidation. 
14 The dummy considers whether the secured creditors have the right or not to collateral in the event of reorganization. 
15 The dummy equals one if the reorganization procedures impose restrictions, such as creditor consent to file for reorganization. Such 
protection is called Chapter 11 in the USA. 
16 The dummy equals one when an official, appointed by the court or creditors, is responsible for the operation of the business during 
reorganization. This variable also equals one if the debtor does not keep the administration of the property pending the resolution of the 
reorganization process. 
17 This is an index which aggregates previous creditor rights. The index ranges from 0 to 4. 
18 This is the minimum mandatory percentage of total share capital required to avoid the dissolution of an existing firm. Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
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Many other scholars, however, consider that politics and political institutions matter, and are 
more important than legal origins (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2004; 
Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, 2005). Nonetheless, it is  clear that the size and structure of banking 
systems are influenced by both the demand for and the supply of financial services. The demand for 
banks and financial services is an endogenous outcome of the size and structure of the real economy. 
When wealth is highly concentrated, and the overall level of development is low, demand for banks 
is modest
19; but, as economies grow, and wealth becomes more widely distributed, demand for bank 
and  financial  services  increases  (Haber,  2008).  However,  according  to  Haber  (2008),  bank  and 
financial service supply and demand depend on four factors: expropriation, contract enforcement, 
imprudent bankers, and political institution centrality. 
In order to eliminate or reduce the problem of expropriation, the only solution for a country is 
to creation political institutions that limit the authority and discretion of government (for example, 
when the central bank is independent). Alesina et al.(2003), and Easterly and Levine (2003), argue 
that in economies where there are major ethnic differences, the ruling group tends to implement 
policies that expropriate resources, and to restrict the rights of other ethnic groups. In the same vein, 
Fafchamps (2001) shows, in a study on Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, that in the case of 
“trade credit usage”, there is an ethnic bias among manufacturing firms. The direction of this bias is, 
in  general,  detrimental  to  entrepreneurs  of  African  descent,  but  favourable  to  entrepreneurs 
originating  from  outside  Africa.  In  this  study,  statistical  discrimination  and  network  effects  can 
exclude  certain  firms  from  credit  markets  and  from  “normal”  commercial  practices.  Black 
entrepreneurs and female-headed firms appear to have a harder time obtaining supplier credit, but 
ethnicity and gender do not greatly interfere with access to bank overdrafts and formal loans. 
The problem of contract enforcement: For an extensive financial system to exist in a country, 
property rights must be transparent and enforceable at low cost (La Porta and Sivanes 1998; Levine 
1999, Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000)). In countries where the judicial system facilitates contracts 
between private agents, and protects the rights of property and investors, savers are more inclined 
to invest in financial markets The country must have laws and rules which give guarantees to debtors 
and banks (a property register, a law regarding bankruptcy and foreclosure, a police force with the 
power of coercion). Countries with effective legal systems, and whose financial systems offer lower 
interest, are more efficient (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2005).  
In what concerns the enforcement of laws, La Porta and Lopez de Silvanes (1998) consider the 
quality of legal rule enforcement, as well as that of their accounting systems. Do laws give enough 
protection,  especially  as  regards  corporate  bankruptcy/  reorganization?  These  authors  use  five 
investor indicators, plus an index of the quality of a country’s accounting standards
20; the efficiency 
of its judicial system
21; the rule of law
22; the level of corruption
23; the risk of expropriation
24; and the 
likelihood of governmental contract repudiation
25. 
For all these points, the quality of financial institutions matters but so, too, does the particular 
type  of  religion.  For  Stulz  and  Williamson  (2003),  religion  and  culture  influence  financial 
                                                      
19 We can use the Gini coefficient of income inequality to measure this situation. 
20 For La Porta and Lopez de Silvanes (1998), accounting plays a crucial role in corporate governance. If investors are to know anything 
about the companies they invest in, basic accounting standards are needed to render company disclosures interpretable. 
21 This index, an assessment of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business”, is produced by Business 
International Corporation. 
22 This index, an assessment of the law and order tradition in the country, is produced by International Country Risk. 
23 This index, an assessment of corruption in government, is produced by International Country Risk. 
24 This index, an assessment of “outright confiscation” or “forced nationalization”, is produced by International Country Risk. 
25 This index is created by examining and rating companies on their inclusion or omission of 90 items including general information, income 
statements, balance sheets, fund flow statements, accounting standards, stock dates. Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
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development, so that Catholic and Muslim countries maintain, for example, more controls, and limit 
competition and private property rights. Consequently, we also include a dummy variable to indicate 
whether or not Islamic law matters in a particular country. 
The  problem  of  imprudent  bankers.  For  banks  to  grow  beyond  the  wealth  of  their  initial 
shareholders,  they  must  attract  the  wealth  of  outsider  individuals  and  firms.  These  outsiders 
(depositors) will not deploy their wealth if they fear that bankers might behave imprudently. In order 
to avoid this, institutions can be created to reduce this risk (reserves against risk). Consequently, in 
what concerns financial development, the legal and judicial framework do matter. 
The centrality of political institutions: Centralized and powerful states are more responsive to, 
and efficient at, implementing policies that protect the interest of the elite than is the case for 
decentralized, competitive political systems. As the banking system constitutes a source of finance 
for government, this means that powerful, centralized states are more sensitive to bank system 
control and tend to foster bank concentration (Haber 2004, Rajan and Zingales (2003). Governmental 
financial sources include revenues from taxes on bank capital or bank profits, dividend income from 
bank stock, and the mandatory purchase of government bonds. Centralized and powerful states are 
more likely to control these sources of funds to finance their debt. The amount of the national debt, 
as  well  as  its  financing  by  securities  or  credits
26,  and  the  size  of  securities  markets,  are  good 
indicators of financial depth.  
In this respect, relations between the financial system and government are crucial. On the one 
hand,  central  banks,  which  apply  the  country’s  monetary  policy,  are  relatively  independent  of 
governments. On the other hand, intensity of competition between banks is determined by politics, 
and the government relies on banks and markets to provide it with a source of funds (national debt 
can be financed by monetary financing or by bond markets). The growth of both banks and securities 
markets is not possible without a government that ensures the enforcement of financial contracts. 
The interest conflict between these agents has a strong influence on financial development.  
Equally,  government  policy  influences  financial  development.  In  order  to  promote  a  well-
functioning  financial  system,  governments  must  ensure  a  stable  political  and  macroeconomic 
environment,  because  instability  and  corruption
27  have  negative  effects  on  the  business 
environment, financial development and growth (Detragiache, Gupta and Tressel, 2005; Ayyagari, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005). Monetary policy choices also affect financial development, 
and empirical studies show that lower and stable inflation rates permit higher levels of financial 
development (banks and stock markets) (Boyd, Levine and Smith, 2001). When state-owned banks 
are predominant - which is often the case in LDCs - the financial system is less developed, more 
concentrated, and countries are more likely to face systematic risks (La Porta et al 2002). 
3. Empirical analysis: Methods and data 
3.1 Data 
The first dataset consists of 154 countries. The reference year for all observations is 2005 but 
when data observations were missing, we retain older data until 2000. This strategy seems relevant 
since we use mainly structural variables which are quite time-invariant. In spite of this adjustment, 
there are always missing values. Yet, one of the main purposes of our study is to construct a typology 
of financial models for a sample as large as possible including industrialized, transition, emerging and 
                                                      
26 In our empirical study we introduce the amount of public debt financed by securities. 
27 In our empirical study we introduce corruption indicators.  Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
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less-developed countries. So the treatment of missing observations is an important issue. We have 
cut down the initial sample of 154 countries by eliminating those for which less than 50% of variables 
were  known  and  controlled  for  the  representativeness  of  the  remaining  sample
28.  In  the  entire 
analysis, the role of the remaining missing data has been cancelled out using the corresponding 
mean values. Finally we use only of 133 countries in our empirical study
29. 
In  connection  with  the  previous  literature,  fourteen  quantitative  variables  are  retained  to 
implement PCA and k-means cluster analysis
30. 
  -  The  Liquid  liabilities  (M3)  as  a  percent  of  GDP  (M3);  a  measurement  of  Financial 
Development noted by FD
31 and a measurement of Financial Architecture (to determine if system is 
bank-oriented or market-oriented) noted by ARCHI
32. DOMCRE measures part of the bank credit in 
the financing of economy. 
ARCHI, DOMCRE , M3 and FD measure liquidity, size and structure of financial system. 
  - We use also two indexes to measure investor and creditors protections: Legal rights of 
Borrowers and Lenders Index (noted LRLI)
33 and a Credit Information Availability index noted by 
CIA
34. One variable measures both difficulties to obtain capital and the degree of competition in 
banking sector: level of Lending Interest Rate (%) noted by LIR.  
  - Two variables measure internal banking regulation at the level on interest rates: INT_CONT 
which measures if interest rates or controlled by state, central banks or if banks can propose freely 
interest rate
35 ; CDTREG which measures a more general internal banking regulation by state or 
central banks (rules, ownership of banks, foreign bank competition,… )
36.  It) measures the degree of 
competition between banks (more the rate is low more the competition is strong). It also measures 
the degree of accessibility to the capital 
  -  Two  variables  measure  investment  restrictions  on  international  capital  movements: 
CAPCONTC  is  an  index  which  measures  if  exist  restriction  on  international  capital  movements 
(without consider restrictions on FDI); CAPCONTC measures restrictions on inflows of capital_index 
where a higher score indicates less restrictions to capital inflows. We use also CAPCONT–I which 
measures percentage of capital controls not levied as a share of the total number of capital controls 
listed by IMF_index and where a higher score means a smaller number of capital controls are used –  
  - Finally we add level of FDI (percent of GDP) as a proxy of globalization and openness of 
financial system. INV_REST measures the level of restrictions on FDI. 
The  data  summary  statistics  and  simple  correlations  between  considered  variables  are  in 
appendix 1. The correlation matrix shows that four variable are strongly correlated the some with 
others: Domestic Credit; M3 (Liquidity); Financial Development and Market capitalization. We choose 
to keep all this variables in analysis because this allow us to describe either the depth of the financial 
                                                      
28 We fill missing values by assigning the nearest neighbour observation on the basis of all the variables retained for the analysis, but when 
number of missing values was too significant we eliminate countries.  
29 Note that complete information is available for 133 countries (86% of the sample) and that 3.75% of them only suffer a single missing 
variable. 
30 The sources are presented in table A1. 
31 This variable is constructed as the sum of market capitalization plus domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP). 
32 This variable is constructed as the ratio of market capitalization to domestic credit provided by banking sector. 
33 This index varies from 0 (less protection) to 10 (more protection). 
34 This index varies from 0 (less information) to 6 (more information).  
35 This index varies from 0 (less protection) to 10 (more protection). 
36 This index varies from 0 (less protection) to 10 (more protection). Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
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market, the size of capital markets (and to test the hypothesis of the market-based), or the level of 
domestic credit (and to test the hypothesis of the bank-market- oriented) in each countries. 
3.2. Principal Component Analysis 
In the first time we realize Principal Component Analysis (PCA).This empirical method allows 
the synthetic representation, mostly graphical, of large data tables. The basic principle is to reduce 
the number of dimensions of a table so as to obtain pertinent information. This compression of data 
is carried out without much loss of information.  Factorial analysis methods consist in searching a low 
dimension subspace as the best proxy for the initial scatter of points (multidimensional). Proximities 
within the factorial space are analysed to understand links between variables, and the similarities 
among statistical units. To complete analysis three categorical variables describing the geographical 
localization, the HDI level and the socio-economic situation of each country have been added as 
supplementary variables in the analysis
37. With this categorical variables we can note that our sample 
of countries includes 31,58% of emerging countries (appendix 2). 
The results of PCA are summarized in table 1 and figure 2, 3. The number of components to 
retain depends on (i) the proportion of total variance explained by each component, (ii) the absolute 
variance explained by each component (the Eigenvalue of each component retained should excess 
one) and (iii) the ability of each component to be interpreted meaningfully. By examining the results 
of PCA, we can extract four principal components, accounting for more than 62 percent of the total 
variance. 
Table 1  below  shows  PCA  Eigen  values
38,  active  variables  correlation  and  supplementary 
variable coordinates. We choose to examine the two first principal components because, if four 
components have Eigenvalues superior to 1 (Kaiser’s criterion of factor extraction), there is a break 
after the second component in the screeplot. The first axis explains 33.54% of the total variance and 
the second 11.68%. In consequence, we capture 45.21% of the complete information of the dataset 
only on the first plan.  
The first component explains about 35 percent of total variance. The contributions of variables 
show that F1 captures mostly negative correlations between M3, DF (liquidity, market size), CIA 
(credit information), INV-REST (restriction on FDI), INT_CONT. Consequently, countries with a deep 
financial market are those which have a good credit information, a deregulate bank system, low 
internal controls on banks and low restriction on capital movements. Not surprisingly, correlations of 
supplementary variables with this component show that LDC, with low HDI, mostly of Sub-Saharan 
Africa or South Asia, have poor financial systems and that industrialized or emerging countries, with 
high or very high HDI, form OECD or Europe and Central Asia, have the most developed financial 
systems. (Table 1) . As an illustration, United Kingdom (or Honk-Kong) which is a big financial place 
with high INV-REST index, a deregulate system and where FDI represents 7% of GDP (Graph 2). 
                                                      
37 Note that these variables do not affect the construction of principal factors.. 
38 The ‘factorability’ of the database was verified: The Bartlett’s test of sphericity shows that the correlation matrix is statistically different 
from an identity matrix (p=0.000) and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.8 which is close to 1 (>0.6) indicating that 
patterns of correlation are relatively compact. Therefore, factor analysis is appropriate.  Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
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Table 1. PCA Eigen values – active variable-axes correlations
1 and supplementary variable 
coordinates 
  PC1  PC2  PC3  PC4  PC5 
Eigen values  4.6951  1.6350  1.2664  1.1002  .9194 
% of variance  33.54  11.68  9.05  7.86  6.57 
Cumulative %  33.54  45.21  54.26  62.12  68.69 
Domestic credit  -0.81  -0.08  0.33  -0.14  -0.28 
M3  -0.75  0.22  0.15  -0.24  -0.30 
Market capitalization  -0.64  0.60  0.10  -0.09  0.08 
Financial development  -0.91  0.27  0.19  -0.14  -0.7 
Financial architecture  -0.38  0.48  -0.23  -0.20  0.63 
Legal-right  -0.55  -0.13  -0.12  0.25  0.7 
CIA  -0.55  -0.43  0.2  0.18  -0.3 
Lend-ir  0.49  0.25  0.27  0.17  -0.27 
Investment restrictions  -0.76  -0.26  -0.50  0.20  0.10 
FDI  -0.28  0.39  -0.28  0.43  -0.25 
Kcontrol1  -0.19  -0.3  0.47  0.68  0.34 
Kcontrol2  -0.10  0.32  -0.56  0.42  -0.23 
Interest control  -0.50  -0.41  -0.49  -0.17  -0.09 
Credit regulation  -0.54  -0.41  -0.20  0.18  0.13 
OECD  -2.43  -0.63  0.49  -0.16  0.11 
East Asia and Pacific  -2.19  0.80  -0.43  0.23  -0.34 
Europe and Central Asia  0.23  -0.57  -0.56  0.69  0.22 
Latin America and the Caribbeans  0.62  -0.28  0.16  -0.09  0.13 
Middle-East and North Africa  -0.46  1.06  -0.13  -1.03  -0.22 
Sub-Saharan Africa  1.80  0.36  0.15  0.7  -0.12 
South Asia   0.58  -0.45  -0.16  -0.67  0.16 
Low HDI  2.00  0.52  0.15  -0.7  0.4 
Middle HDI  0.44  -0.08  -0.25  -0.11  -0.45 
High HDI  -0.15  -0.23  -0.08  0.20  0.47 
Very high HDI  -2.26*  -0.32  0.14  0.03  0.07 
Industrialized countries  -1.43  -0.64  0.19  0.20  0.07 
Emerging countries
2  -0.80  0.00  -0.30*  -0.28  -0.05 
Developing countries  -0.60*  0.37  -0.22  0.19  0.00 
Less developed countries  2.23  0.51*  0.44  -0.05  -0.01 
Notes: (1) for supplementary variables, significant correlations at a 5 % level are shown in bold characters; (2) emerging 
countries are those that have been considered as such by at least one of the following institutions: Boston Consulting Group, 
BNP Paribas, IMF or Standard and Poor’s 
The first factor also captures positive correlation between these variables and the LIR (lending 
interest  rate).  Therefore,  the  localisation  of  countries  regarding  this  first  component  can  be 
interpreted in terms of financial development depth (or not) but also in terms of access facilities to 
funds.  Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
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Graph 1. Projection of active variables on the first factorial plan 
 
This first component distinguishes so countries according to their level financial development. 
Poor systems are localised on the left of the first plan while very sophisticated and complete systems 
are on the right. For example, on the projection of the individuals on the first plan (cf. graph 2), we 
can see on the right of the plan countries like, USA, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, France, New 
Zealand or Denmark. Countries where financial markets are mature. On the other side, in Ethiopia, 
Sierra-Leone, Mozambique, Guinea or Niger but in also China, Brazil, India accessibility to the capital 
markets remains difficult. 
Graph 2. Projection of countries on the first factorial plan 















































































































































Most of the variance explained by component F2 comes from the variable FDI and Market 
capitalization, CAPCONTC and finally by ARCHI. Consequently, this second factor captures, for capital 
movements, the degree of country’s international openness, level of deregulation systems but also 
the fact of countries are market based. In our empirical study countries which accept international 
capital movements, which are also market-oriented, accept a high level of deregulation (top of graph 
2). Countries which are more bank-oriented are also more regulate (bottom of Graph.2) Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
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Graph 3. Projection of active variables on the second factorial plan 






































The contributions of variables show that F3 captures negative correlations between, Capital 
control, interest control, investment restriction, banking sector regulation. Consequently, countries 
with poor financial market but bank-based there are also countries with deregulate system (in the 
graph the southeast part F1-F2). F3 indicating that we can oppose countries with large deregulate 
system and countries with weak but system strongly regulate. 
Graph 4. Projection of countries on the second factorial plan 




















































































































































As a result of PCA, countries can be classified regarding the degree of financial development, 
the degree of international openness and banking sector controls level.  Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
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In order to back up PCA results, twenty-five bootstrap replications of the initial sample have 
been implemented in order to provide confidence intervals for the projected variables coordinates.. 
This method indicates a real stability of our results because only some isolated points of replication 
cross two axes. Then we can establish our comments on all the variables retained without any fear . 
The last analyse supports the idea of a four group classification so as to identify models of 
financial development deep or not, bank-based or not, regulate or not As we can on the right side in 
graph2  the  projection  of  countries  on  the  first  factorial  plan,  there  are  mainly  industrialized 
countries, and the former and “old” emerging countries (Hong-Kong, Korea, and Thailand). On the 
left side, there are only less developed countries. But the situation of all these countries does not 
seem homogeneous regarding F2.  
If PCA helps suggesting a classification, it cannot identify precisely the composition and the 
characteristics of different categories. The construction of typologies is the main objective of cluster 
analysis methods. 
3.3. Three models of financial development 
In a second step, we use cluster analysis in order to construct a typology of financial models. 
Cluster analysis is a statistical method that classifies objects (i.e. countries) into clusters according to 
the characteristics of the objects (that have been identified with PCA). Objects in the same cluster 
share significant homogeneity whereas there is significant heterogeneity among objects in different 
clusters. In this study, we run k-means cluster analysis which is a non-hierarchical cluster method 
that fits well for a set of continuous variables. It produces only one solution for a predetermined 
number of clusters. 
A k-means cluster analysis has been implemented on the basis of the 14 variables of PCA in 
order to classify 133 countries into three may be fuzzy because some countries may have a financial 
system profile that is in fact not really distinct from the average one. It’s the reason why we create a 
fourth category by selecting the 10 percent of countries whose Euclidean distance to the average 
observation is the weakest (indistinct group). In order to define the groups that cluster analysis has 
generated, the means of classification and characterization variables for each cluster are reported in 
table 2. The composition of each group is shown in table 3. 
 Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
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Table 3 : Composition of the clusters 
Indistinct 
G0 
embryonic financial system 
G1 
Intermediate Financial system 
bank-Oriented 
G2 
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Table 2a - Compared means of active, supplementary  
 
Indistinct 













Domestic credit  49,06  21.90  57.55  160.09  64.09 
M3  45,09  30.66  52.20  118.85  53.88 
Market capitalization  31,38  21.71  50.25  145.35  66.91 
Financial development  73,50  29.50  103.76  305.72  114.01 
Financial architecture  0,49  0.08  1.04  1.02  0.68 
Legal-right  4,46  4.21  4.61  7.18  4.90 
CIA  3,07  1.52  3.88  5.04  3.24 
Lend-ir  11,34  23.99  11.20  6.06  14.35 
Investment restrictions  6,57  4.37  6.57  7.93  6.10 
FDI  3,47  3.23  3.71  17.44  6.00 
KcontrolC  10  9.69  9.94  10  9.88 
KcontrolI  5,35  5.46  5.84  5.58  5.62 
Interest control  9,57  8.22  9.71  9.95  9.27 
Credit regulation  8,41  7.38  8.37  0.06  8.18 
GDP per capita  1.096e+04  2.3704e+03  1.2484e+04  3.0238e+04  1.2200e+04 
HDI  2.3  3.6  2.3  1.22  2.5 
Gini capita 
(current US$ 2006)  8255  1122  9874  33611  11066 
Notes: (1) emerging countries are those that have been considered as such by at least one of the following 
institutions: Boston Consulting Group, BNP Paribas, IMF or Standard and Poor’s (2) The values that significantly 
differ from those of all other countries at a 5% level (independent samples t-test) are in bold; those at a 10% 
level are in bold and italics. 














OECD  7  0  13  65.2 
East Asia and Pacific  14  2.4  7.4  21.7 
Europe and Central Asia  42  9.5  24.1  0 
Latin America and the Caribbeans  14  95  27.8  0 
Middle-East and North Africa  7  7.1  11.1  8.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa  7  71.4  9.3  4.3 
South Asia  7  0  7.4  0 
TOTAL  100  100  100  100 
Low HDI  0  71.4  13  0 
Medium HDI  42.9  26.2  25.9  8.7 
High HDI  35.7  2.4  40.7  4.3 
Very high HDI  14.3  0  20.4  82.7 
TOTAL  100  100  100  95(4.3%mising) 
Industrialized countries  21.4  9.5  27.8  65.2 
Emerging countries
1  57.1  14.3  24.1  21.7 
Developing countries  31.24  21.4  24.1  13 
Less developed countries  0  54.8  5.6  0 
TOTAL  100  100  100  100 
Notes: (1) emerging countries are those that have been considered as such by at least one of the following 
institutions: Boston Consulting Group, BNP Paribas, IMF or Standard and Poor’s (2) The values that significantly 
differ from those of all other countries at a 5% level (independent samples t-test) are in bold; those at a 10% 
level are in bold and italics. Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
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The first group describes a financial system in maturity: deep; market-based and deregulate 
(low internal and external regulation). This group, in each case, has highest means for all variables. 
This category is quite representative of liberal system market oriented. Three developed countries 
which are typical of this liberal model (United States, United Kingdom, and Canada).  
When we consider means of variables it seems more easily to compare the first group with the 
third group which has in lot of cases lowest means. The third group has a weak system, investors and 
creditors are badly protected, banking regulation is strong and it is difficult to obtain the capital. level 
of regulation on international flows is also very high The third group describes an embryonic financial 
system.  In this category we find mainly countries of sub-Saharan Africa.   
Finally the composition of the second cluster confirms is proximity with the liberal model of 
financial development (financial system in maturity). Mean variables show that several features of 
the liberal model exits in this group but financial system is less developed and his structure is bank 
oriented.  In  group  1,  the  mean  of  variable  ARCHI  is  lower  than  1,  then  direct  finance  is  more 
important in the economy. In the group 2, variables ARCHI is superior to 1, the indirect finance 
dominates. We name this group: Intermediate financial system bank oriented. 
4. Conclusion 
We find standard results according to which there are two types of financial systems: market-
oriented and bank-oriented.  LDC countries are characterized by weakness of their system, a strong 
banking regulation and a difficult access to financing. 
We  find  emerging  countries  in  all  groups  of  countries.  However,  they  are  relatively  more 
numerous  in  the  group  2.  We  cannot  say  without  an  econometric  study  if  it  is  the  financial 
development which accompanied the “take-off” or the opposite. However it seems that the financial 
development (rather of banking type and rather regulated) which characterizes numerous emerging 
countries 
.Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
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Appendix 1 
Table A.1b corrélation Matrix (Pearson (n)) 
Variables  domcred  M3  mkt_cap  devfin  archi  leg_rights  cred_info  lend_ir  inv_restr  fdi  Kcont_c  Kcont_i  int_cont  cdtreg_c 
domcred  1  0,683  0,420  0,850  0,084  0,362  0,470  -0,304  0,570  0,107  0,138  -0,081  0,306  0,325 
M3  0,683  1  0,531  0,733  0,220  0,294  0,289  -0,264  0,457  0,183  0,085  0,131  0,263  0,208 
mkt_cap  0,420  0,531  1  0,789  0,469  0,256  0,118  -0,157  0,276  0,309  0,105  0,100  0,084  0,166 
devfin  0,850  0,733  0,789  1  0,404  0,399  0,395  -0,314  0,579  0,243  0,137  0,048  0,286  0,328 
archi  0,084  0,220  0,469  0,404  1  0,118  0,015  -0,192  0,268  0,122  0,005  0,135  0,090  0,091 
leg_rights  0,362  0,294  0,256  0,399  0,118  1  0,188  -0,206  0,409  0,110  0,127  0,096  0,243  0,426 
cred_info  0,470  0,289  0,118  0,395  0,015  0,188  1  -0,271  0,480  0,022  0,225  -0,006  0,277  0,376 
lend_ir  -0,304  -0,264  -0,157  -0,314  -0,192  -0,206  -0,271  1  -0,346  -0,068  -0,045  -0,020  -0,391  -0,262 
inv_restr  0,570  0,457  0,276  0,579  0,268  0,409  0,480  -0,346  1  0,135  0,166  0,009  0,484  0,441 
fdi  0,107  0,183  0,309  0,243  0,122  0,110  0,022  -0,068  0,135  1  0,073  0,216  0,087  0,113 
Kcont_c  0,138  0,085  0,105  0,137  0,005  0,127  0,225  -0,045  0,166  0,073  1  -0,007  -0,111  0,076 
Kcont_i  -0,081  0,131  0,100  0,048  0,135  0,096  -0,006  -0,020  0,009  0,216  -0,007  1  0,098  -0,006 
int_cont  0,306  0,263  0,084  0,286  0,090  0,243  0,277  -0,391  0,484  0,087  -0,111  0,098  1  0,382 
cdtreg_c  0,325  0,208  0,166  0,328  0,091  0,426  0,376  -0,262  0,441  0,113  0,076  -0,006  0,382  1 
Les  valeurs  en  gras  sont  significativement  différentes  de  0  à  un  niveau  de  signification 
alpha=0,05             
 Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
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Table A.1c  Data summary statistics - Averages for 13 countries (standard deviation) 













































































































































































































































































N  131  23  12  22  21  12  36  5 
Table A.1d  Data summary statistics - Averages for 13 countries (standard deviation) 

































































































































































N  128  35  32  28  32 
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Table A.1e  Data summary statistics - Averages for 13 countries (standard deviation) 
 

























































































































































N  131  37  41  28  26 
* In that table, emerging countries are those that have been considered as such by at least one of the following 
institutions: Boston Consulting Group, BNP Paribas, IMF or Standard and Poor’s Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
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Appendix 2 
Table A.1 a Elementary statistics about supplementary variables 
Distributions of categorical variables 
Variables  Bases 
Countries groups  Absolu  %/ Total 
LDC  28  21.5 
Emerging countries  42  31.58 
Developed countries  37  27.82 
LDC  26  19.55 
Missing  0  0 
All  133  100 
Distributions of categorical variables 
Variables  Bases 
HDI  Absolu  %/ Total 
H.HDI  28  21.5 
L.HDI  37  27.82 
M.HDI  33  24.81 
V.L.HDI  32  24.06 
Missing  2  1.5 
All  133  100 
Distributions of categorical variables 
Variables  Bases 
Regional Groups  Absolu  %/ Total 
East Asia and Pacific  12  9.02 
Europe and Central Asia   23  17.29 
Latin America and the Caribbeans   21  15.79 
Middle-East and North Africa   12  9.02 
OCDE  23  17.23 
South Asia   5  3.76 
Sub-Saharan Africa   37  27.82 
Missing   0  0 
All  133  100 
 Model of Financial Development: a cluster analysis 
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